Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille: une revue de littérature

Raphaëlle Bellando

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Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the agency problem in portfolio management delegation. The fact that there is no optimal contract in this case is well-documented. More recent papers have shown that this problem can be solved by adding to the contract some management constraints. However some empirical studies about implicit incentives demonstrate the convexity of the manager's compensation, due to an asymmetric relation between flow of funds and the past performances of the fund. Finally, we review empirical work about two important consequences of this agency problem: herding and excessive risk taking.

Keywords: portfolio management; agency problem; mutual funds; Gestion d'actif déléguée; problème d'agence; fonds de placements; OPCVM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2008, 118 (3), pp.317-339

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Journal Article: Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille: une revue de littérature (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00308570

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