Piecework versus merit pay: a mean field games approach to academic behavior

Damien Besancenot, Jean-Michel Courtault () and Khaled El Dika

Revue d'économie politique, 2012, vol. 122, issue 4, 547-563

Abstract: This paper applies the mean field game approach pioneered by Lasry and Lions [2007] to the analysis of researchers? academic productivity. It provides a theoretical motivation for the stability of the universally observed Lotka?s law. It shows that a remuneration scheme taking into account researchers? rank with respect to the academic resume can induce a larger number of researchers to overtake a minimal production standard. It thus appears as superior to piecework remuneration.

Keywords: Mean field game; Lotka's law; incentives; Academic research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Piecework versus merit pay: a Mean Fi eld Game approach to academic behavior (2011)
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