Piecework versus merit pay: a Mean Fi eld Game approach to academic behavior

Damien Besancenot, Jean-Michel Courtault () and Khaled El Dika ()
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Khaled El Dika: LAGA - Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - Institut Galilée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper applies the Mean Fi eld Game approach pioneered by Lasry and Lions (2007) to the analysis of the researchers' academic productivity. It provides a theoretical motivation for the stability of the universaly observed Lotka's law. It shows that a remuneration scheme taking into account the researchers rank with respect to the academic resume can induce a larger number of researchers to overtake a minimal production standard. It thus appears as superior to piecework remuneration.

Keywords: Lotka's law; Mean Field Game; Academic production; incentives; Lotka's law. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-sog
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00632171v1
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Journal Article: Piecework versus merit pay: a mean field games approach to academic behavior (2012)
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