Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited

Eric Kamwa and Fabrice Valognes

Revue d'économie politique, 2017, vol. 127, issue 3, 375-395

Abstract: For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok?s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.

Keywords: scoring rules; Condorcet; preference restrictions; strong Borda paradox; impartialanonymous culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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