Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited

Eric Kamwa and Fabrice Valognes ()
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Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok's algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.

Keywords: strong Borda paradox; impartial anonymous culture; scoring rules; Condorcet; preference restrictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631180
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127 (3), pp.375-395. ⟨10.3917/redp.273.0375⟩

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Journal Article: Scoring Rules and Preference Restrictions: The Strong Borda Paradox Revisited (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01631180

DOI: 10.3917/redp.273.0375

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