Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques

Francoise Forges

Revue d'économie politique, 2017, vol. 127, issue 4, 467-493

Abstract: Starting from a Bayesian game which accounts for the agents? interaction in absence of any cooperation agreement, we survey some scenarios which enable the players to commit to decisions. We compare the effects of these scenarios and suggest some links with contract theory.

Keywords: commitment; cooperation; contract; incentives; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques (2017)
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