Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques

Francoise Forges

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Abstract: Starting from a Bayesian game which accounts for the agents' interaction in absence of any cooperation agreement, we survey some scenarios which enable the players to commit to decisions. We compare the effects of these scenarios and suggest some links with contract theory.

Keywords: commitment; contract; contrat; engagement; incitation; information incomplète; cooperation; incentives; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127 (4), ⟨10.3917/redp.274.0467⟩

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Journal Article: Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02315008

DOI: 10.3917/redp.274.0467

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