Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance

Bruno Deffains and Sébastien Rouillon

Revue d'économie politique, 2018, vol. 128, issue 1, 41-58

Abstract: This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.

Keywords: negligence; strict liability; care level; disappearing defendant; punishment avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance (2018)
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