Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance

B. Deffains () and Sébastien Rouillon

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.

Keywords: Care Level; Disappearing Defendant; Negligence; Punishment Avoidance; Strict Liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue d'économie politique, inPress, 128 (1), pp.41-58. ⟨10.3917/redp.281.0041⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02486338

DOI: 10.3917/redp.281.0041

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().