What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours

Guilhem Lecouteux

Revue d'économie politique, 2018, vol. 128, issue 3, 311-332

Abstract: this editorial presents the main contributions of the theory of team reasoning in game theory, and the issues that remain to be solved before this theory could become a credible alternative to ?orthodox? game theory. I argue in particular that an approach based on collective agency rather than rational choice theory and social preferences offer a scientifically preferable theory of unselfish behaviours, both in terms of parsimony and empirical validation. I review the economic literature on team reasoning, and highlight the contributions of the papers of the present volume to tackle the open issues of the theory of team reasoning.

Keywords: team reasoning; preferences; rationality; cooperation; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
Working Paper: What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
Working Paper: What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
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