What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours
Guilhem Lecouteux ()
No 2018-17, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis
This editorial presents the main contributions of the theory of team reasoning in game theory, and the issues that remain to be solved before this theory could become a credible alternative to 'orthodox' game theory. I argue in particular that an approach based on collective agency rather than rational choice theory and social preferences offer a scientifically preferable theory of unselfish behaviours, both in terms of parsimony and empirical validation. I review the economic literature on team reasoning, and highlight the contributions of the papers of the present volume to tackle the open issues of the theory of team reasoning.
Keywords: team reasoning; preferences; rationality; cooperation; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Journal Article: What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
Working Paper: What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
Working Paper: What Does 'We' Want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-17
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