Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste. Le cas des cantons suisses

Nils Soguel

Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2006, vol. juin, issue 1, 27-48

Abstract: The coordination of fiscal policies between states or municipalities collides with their individual spending and taxing power. When independently adopted, budget rules can potentially endanger the overall need for macroeconomic stabilisation. Utilising the example of the Swiss cantons, the paper analyses the possibility to bring out a counter-cyclical policy when sublevel governments introduce compelling rules to balance or almost balance their budget. It is shown that cantons usually adopt a pro-cyclical behaviour. However this behaviour can be thwarted if the central government uses the vertical intergovernmental transfers as an instrument of its stabilisation policy.

Keywords: coordination; budget rules; subnational governments; pro-cyclicality; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RERU_061_0027 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-regionale-et-urbaine-2006-1-page-27.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste: Le cas des cantons suisses (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:rerarc:reru_061_0027

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine from Armand Colin
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().