Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste: Le cas des cantons suisses

Coordination and decentralisation of budget rules in a federalist structure: The case of Swiss cantons

Nils Soguel

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Summary The coordination of fiscal policies between states or municipalities collides with their individual spending and taxing power. When independently adopted, budget rules can potentially endanger the overall need for macroeconomic stabilisation. Utilising the example of the Swiss cantons, the paper analyses the possibility to bring out a counter-cyclical policy when sublevel governments introduce compelling rules to balance or almost balance their budget. It is shown that cantons usually adopt a pro-cyclical behaviour. However this behaviour can be thwarted if the central government uses the vertical intergovernmental transfers as an instrument of its stabilisation policy.

Keywords: Coordination; budget rules; subnational governments; procyclicality; fiscal federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07, Revised 2005-10
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Published in Revue d'Economie Régionale & Urbaine Nr 1 (2006): pp. 27-48

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination et décentralisation des règles budgétaires dans une structure fédéraliste. Le cas des cantons suisses (2006)
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