Corporate disclosure: A review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs

Etienne Farvaque, Catherine Refait-Alexandre and Dhafer Saidane ()

International Economics, 2011, issue 128, 5–31

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on corporate disclosure. Policymakers often support corporate disclosure but more contrasted views have emerged in the academic literature, showing that even if disclosure can actually benefits to shareholders, it is costly and it may trigger pernicious effects. Disclosing information is expensive (communication and audit costs, competitors access strategic information, and induced managers’ suboptimal behavior). It also generates informational costs, as firms can disclose false, manipulated, too complex or too extensive information. And disclosure can reduce actors’ incentives to look for information about the firm, and therefore can lead to an (potentially destabilizing) illusion of knowledge

Keywords: Disclosure; Governance; Financial Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Corporate disclosure: a review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs (2016)
Working Paper: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: A REVIEW OF ITS (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) BENEFITS AND COSTS (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cii:cepiie:2011-q4-128-1

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