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Corporate disclosure: a review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs

Etienne Farvaque, Catherine Refait-Alexandre and Dhafer Saidane ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on corporate disclosure. Policymakers often support corporate disclosure but more contrasted views have emerged in the academic literature, showing that even if disclosure can actually benefits to shareholders, it is costly and it may trigger pernicious effects. Disclosing information is expensive (communication and audit costs, competitors access strategic information, and induced managers' suboptimal behavior). It also generates informational costs, as firms can disclose false, manipulated, too complex or too extensive information. And disclosure can reduce actors' incentives to look for information about the firm, and therefore can lead to an (potentially destabilizing) illusion of knowledge.

Keywords: Disclosure; Governance; Financial Stability Classification; Transparence; communication; gouvernance; stabilité financière (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01391688v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Corporate disclosure: A review of its (direct and indirect) benefits and costs (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: A REVIEW OF ITS (DIRECT AND INDIRECT) BENEFITS AND COSTS (2011)
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