The Timing of Arbitration and Sequential Bargaining

C. J. McKenna and Venkatraman Sadanand

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 28, issue 4b, 1180-93

Abstract: This paper links two literatures. The paper adds to results on disagreement in perfect information bargaining games. It is found that, under certain conditions, the possibility of third-party intervention induces delay. The paper is also the first attempt to model the arbitration process in a sequential bargaining framework. It therefore adds to the theoretical arm of the industrial relations literature by permitting an explicit temporal setting for the 'chilling effect' and alternative mechanisms for the timing of arbitration.

Date: 1995
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