Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: The Cases of Substitutes and Complements

Marcel Boyer and Michel Moreaux

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999, vol. 32, issue 3, 654-672

Abstract: The authors analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. They show that, whether the products are substitutes or complements, there exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if the advertising cost is zero.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: the Cases of Subsitutes and Complements (1998)
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