Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: the Cases of Subsitutes and Complements
Marcel Boyer () and
Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ
We analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. We show that whether the products are substitutes or complements, these exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if advertising cost is zero.
Keywords: ADVERTISING; OLIGOPOLIES; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: The Cases of Substitutes and Complements (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.502
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