Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: the Cases of Subsitutes and Complements

Marcel Boyer and Michel Moreaux

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. We show that whether the products are substitutes or complements, these exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if advertising cost is zero.

Keywords: ADVERTISING; OLIGOPOLIES; MARKET STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Underinvestment in Informative Advertising: The Cases of Substitutes and Complements (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:98.502

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ GREMAQ, Universite de Toulouse I Place Anatole France 31042 - Toulouse CEDEX France.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().