Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach

Lutz-Alexander Busch and Ignatius Horstmann

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999, vol. 32, issue 4, 956-975

Abstract: In this paper we argue that, by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game, one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts. This point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once-for-all bargain over the entire stream--a long-term contract--or through a series of bargaining rounds--a short-term contract. Within this structure, short-term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions, because a short-term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents. In essence, reduced 'transaction costs' produce a short-term contract.

JEL-codes: C78 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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