Using patents to mislead rivals

Corinne Langinier

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 38, issue 2, 520-545

Abstract: Firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents. Yet they patent, as indicated by the large number of patents that are granted. This paper offers a possible resolution to this puzzle. It takes a simplified version of a duopoly innovation race and studies the patenting decision of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation. It is shown that a firm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival. Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely, even though research incentive may be weakened.

JEL-codes: L1 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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