Using Patents to Mislead Rivals

Corinne Langinier

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Recent surveys report that firms claim they do not rely heavily on patents in order to appropriate a return on their innovation. Yet, firms do patent, as indicated by the large number of patents that are granted. This paper offers a possible resolution to this puzzle. It takes a simplified version of a duopoly innovation race, and studies the patenting decision of an innovator who has private information about the improvability of her innovation. In this setting, it is shown that a firm may use the patenting decision to mislead her rival. Under symmetric information, research can be stimulated but not disclosed. However, under asymmetric information, disclosure is more likely even though the incentive to do research may be weakened.

Date: 2005-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tid
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Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 2005, vol. 38 no. 2, pp. 520-545

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Journal Article: Using patents to mislead rivals (2005)
Journal Article: Using patents to mislead rivals (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:11483

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