Endogenous protection of R&D investments

Chrysovalantou Milliou

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 42, issue 1, 184-205

Abstract: We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. We show that, contrary to findings in most of the literature, the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. Consequently, as long as the R&D spillovers are not too strong, firms decide to let their R&D knowledge flow. Since, as we show, welfare is higher when R&D spillovers are present, it follows that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge could be welfare-enhancing.

JEL-codes: L13 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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