Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S

Per Fredriksson, Xenia Matschke and Jenny Minier

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2011, vol. 44, issue 2, 607-626

Abstract: We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.

JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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