Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems: The Case of the U.S

Per Fredriksson, Xenia Matschke and Jenny Minier

No 2011-01, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.

Keywords: trade policy; majority bias; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S (2011)
Journal Article: Trade policy in majoritarian systems: the case of the U.S (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:201101

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