Wage posting: evidence from job ads

Vera Brenčič
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Vera Brencic

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2012, vol. 45, issue 4, 1529-1559

Abstract: Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage-setting mechanism - either by bargaining or through the posting of a non-negotiable wage offer in a job ad - to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers' search.

JEL-codes: J23 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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