Mixed duopoly, privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

Toshihiro Matsumura and Yoshihiro Tomaru ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 46, issue 2, 526-554

Abstract: We investigate optimal taxsubsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.

JEL-codes: H20 L13 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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