Mixed duopoly, privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

Toshihiro Matsumura and Yoshihiro Tomaru ()

Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 2013, vol. 46, issue 2, 526-554

Abstract: We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare. Duopole mixte, privatisation et subsidisation en présence de fardeau fiscal excédentaire. On examine les politiques optimales de taxes et de subventions dans le cas d'oligopoles mixtes et privés en présence de fardeau fiscal excédentaire. On compare les subsides optimaux et les effets sur le niveau de bien‐être dans quatre régimes : les duopoles de Cournot (mixte et privé) et la concurrence à la Stackelberg avec leadership public et privé. On montre que contrairement à ce que suggéraient les travaux antérieurs sur le théorème de la neutralité de la privatisation, la privatisation affecte les niveaux de bien‐être.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (59)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12022

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Journal Article: Mixed duopoly, privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:canjec:v:46:y:2013:i:2:p:526-554

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