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How Partisan Media Influences Aversion to Political Compromise

Yoo Ji Suh, Dhavan V. Shah and Michael W. Wagner
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Yoo Ji Suh: School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin – Madison, USA
Dhavan V. Shah: School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin – Madison, USA
Michael W. Wagner: School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin – Madison, USA

Media and Communication, 2025, vol. 13

Abstract: We investigate how partisan media during and after the 2020 US presidential (Study 1) and 2022 midterm (Study 2) elections influenced preferences for unyielding politicians who do not compromise with partisan opponents. Our findings suggest that partisan media use may undermine willingness to support politicians who engage in deliberative compromises with opponents. This effect is likely driven by the tendency of partisan media to diminish willingness to engage in political listening and instigate moral considerations of the party’s policy goals.

Keywords: attitude moralization; deliberative democracy; election coverage; partisan asymmetry; partisan media; political compromise; political listening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cog:meanco:v13:y:2025:a:10009

DOI: 10.17645/mac.10009

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