The Conditionality of Political Short‐Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies

Masakazu Ogami
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Masakazu Ogami: Social Systems Division, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan

Politics and Governance, 2024, vol. 12

Abstract: Political short-termism prioritizes short-term net policy benefits over long-term benefits and thus can hinder policy investments that impose short-term costs to society to address long-term policy challenges. This literature review explores when political short-termism can be driven and mitigated in a democratic system by reviewing empirical and experimental studies and identifying the various factors that can influence policy investments: elections, economic conditions, power-sharing arrangements, partisanship, the presence of compensation schemes, and media coverage among politicians; discounts of future policy benefits, policy trade-offs, political ideology, and socioeconomic and demographic factors among voters; and compliance costs, power-sharing arrangements, compensations, and long-term political signaling from governments among special interest groups. Finally, I discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research.

Keywords: democracy; electoral cycles; interest groups; long‐term policymaking; political short‐termism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cog:poango:v12:y:2024:a:7764

DOI: 10.17645/pag.7764

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