How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis

Fabrizio De Francesco and Philipp Trein
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Fabrizio De Francesco: School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, UK
Philipp Trein: Department for Actuarial Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland / Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Politics and Governance, 2020, vol. 8, issue 2, 116-127

Abstract: Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU recommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such measures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second parliamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.

Keywords: corruption; interest groups; international norm emergence; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cog:poango:v8:y:2020:i:2:p:116-127

DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.2708

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