An Imperfect Firewall: Quebec’s Constitutional Right of Secession as a Device Against Domination

Lluís Pérez-Lozano
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Lluís Pérez-Lozano: Department of Political and Social Sciences, Pompeu Fabra University, Spain

Politics and Governance, 2021, vol. 9, issue 4, 475-482

Abstract: The idea of including a right of secession in democratic constitutions has been discussed by different political and legal theorists; however, little has been said on the matter from the point of view of democratic-republican political philosophy. This article undertakes this effort by means of a normative analysis of Quebec’s constitutional right of secession, as outlined in the Quebec Secession Reference. This analysis shows how the non-unilateral nature of this right minimises the risks for republican freedom (as non-domination) and inclusion in the Quebec secession conflict, while the fact that it is limited to a national constitutional framework dampens this achievement.

Keywords: Canada; constitutionalism; democracy; domination; factions; Quebec; republicanism; secession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cog:poango:v9:y:2021:i:4:p:475-482

DOI: 10.17645/pag.v9i4.4569

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