The Informational and Strategic Impacts of Real Earnings Management

Shirley Ho () and Hao-Chang Sung
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Hao-Chang Sung: Department of Money and Banking, National Chengchi University

Annals of Economics and Finance, 2012, vol. 13, issue 2, 355-380

Abstract: We address the informational and strategic impacts of real earnings management (REM) in a two-period oligopoly model with one-sided information. For the strategic impacts of REM, once the demand falls short of expectation, a firm should raise the price instead of cutting it to reach the earnings target. For the informational impacts, to maintain opponents' uncertainty, the privately informed firm could conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy and setting the first period price to be higher than in the separating equilibrium. Finally, the presence of tunnelling from cross-shareholding firm will enhance the price cut in the second period.

Keywords: Real earnings management; Incomplete information; Price manipulation; Cross-shareholding; Tunnelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D83 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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