Bargaining for European Union Farm Policy Reform through U.S. Pesticide Restrictions

Lizbeth Martin, Philip L. Paarlberg and John G. Lee

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 137-146

Abstract: Future trade negotiations will incorporate environmental concerns. This study presents a framework to evaluate whether the United States would be willing to adopt a pesticide restriction in exchange for European Union liberalization of producer support. It outlines the conditions that must be met if a bargain is to occur. Partial equilibrium commodity models test whether the conditions for a bargaining solution are satisfied. The research results indicate that a potential bargain is possible for stricter U.S. environmental regulations in coarse grains if there is a sufficiently large positive EU externality. Conditions in the oilseed market preclude a bargain.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:agrerw:v:28:y:1999:i:02:p:137-146_00

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