A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession to a European Customs Union

P. Lynn Kennedy and Cemal Atici

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 147-157

Abstract: The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey's best interest, from an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of agricultural protection levels.

Date: 1999
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