The Socially Optimal Import Tariff and Tax Credit for Ethanol with Farm Subsidies

Harry de Gorter (), David Just and Qinwen Tan

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2009, vol. 38, issue 1, 65-77

Abstract: We determine how the U.S. ethanol tax credit and import tariff affect the corn-ethanol-gasoline markets and how farm subsidies interact with these policies. We show how the ethanol tax credit and import tariff each uniquely affect the ethanol and gasoline prices. The ethanol import tariff alone increases the terms of trade in ethanol imports and corn exports, but decreases the terms of trade in gasoline imports and the tax costs of farm price supports. With price-contingent farm subsidies in place, the optimal tariff and tax credit will depend on the price level. When farm subsidy expenditures are high, import subsidies for ethanol may increase social welfare due to the substantial size of the fuel market relative to the corn market.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Socially Optimal Import Tariff and Tax Credit for Ethanol with Farm Subsidies (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:agrerw:v:38:y:2009:i:01:p:65-77_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Agricultural and Resource Economics Review from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().