Analysis and History of Political Thought

Peter J. Steinberger

American Political Science Review, 2009, vol. 103, issue 1, 135-146

Abstract: Criticisms of Quentin Skinner's approach to the study of the history of political thought have generally failed to directly address the philosophical presuppositions on which Skinner himself relies. Those presuppositions involve, primarily, theories of language associated most closely with Austin, Searle, and Grice. An investigation of the uses that Skinner makes of philosophical pragmatics raises serious doubts about a number of his central claims. Moreover, those philosophical resources actually point toward a decidedly non-Skinnerian approach that focuses not primarily on discovering or reconstructing historical circumstances, but on uncovering and explicating structures of argumentation.

Date: 2009
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