The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM

R. Blake McMahon and Branislav L. Slantchev

American Political Science Review, 2015, vol. 109, issue 3, 636-636

Abstract: Owing to an editorial oversight, the citation and reference for Piplani and Talmadge (2015) was deleted twice on page 307 of the May 2015 issue of American Political Science Review. The citations should read as follows: In this context, it is useful to consider the empirical results of two studies that find that the probability of coups is lower if the country is involved in a war (Piplani and Talmadge, 2015) and even in a crisis (Arbatli and Arbatli, 2014). The explanatory mechanisms these studies offer are different (although not necessarily incompatible): Piplani and Talmadge (2015) argue that when the military is engaged in a war there are fewer opportunities for a coup and more uncertainty about who will join it, whereas Arbatli and Arbatli (2014) argue that crises allow rulers to commit credibly to transfers to the military and to generate rally-around-the-flag effects. Also, owing to a printer's error on page 305, Qaddafi is misspelled as Qaddaf. We regret these errors.

Date: 2015
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