Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy

Henry Merritt Wriston

American Political Science Review, 1916, vol. 10, issue 3, 481-499

Abstract: The unusual circumstances of the present diplomatic situation of the United States resulting from the European war and the revolution in Mexico have led the present administration to resort to the use of presidential diplomatic agents. The missions of ex-Governor John Lind and of William Bayard Hale to Mexico, and the errands of Col. E. M. House in Europe have aroused considerable discussion of their diplomatic status, which gives point to an effort to explain the basis for the employment of presidential special agents in diplomacy.At no point is the Constitution more definite and specific than in dealing with the appointing power of the President. Part of Article II, Section 2 reads: “He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.” The third section of the same article reads: “The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.” There would seem to be no loophole here by which the President could either create an office not before existing, or, unless there is specific statutory warrant, appoint an individual to office without senatorial confirmation.

Date: 1916
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