Who Debates, Who Wins? At-Scale Experimental Evidence on the Supply of Policy Information in a Liberian Election

Jeremy Bowles and Horacio Larreguy

American Political Science Review, 2025, vol. 119, issue 4, 1684-1703

Abstract: We examine how the effects of initiatives intended to promote programmatic competition are conditioned by candidates’ often mixed incentives to participate in them. In a nationwide debate initiative designed to solicit and widely rebroadcast policy promises from Liberian legislative candidates, we analyze the randomized encouragement of debate participation across districts. The intervention substantially increased the debate participation of leading candidates but had uneven electoral consequences, with incumbents benefiting at the expense of their challengers. These results are driven by incumbents’ more positive selection into participation on the basis of their policy alignment with voters; voters’ heightened attention to them; and how candidates’ campaigns responded in turn. The results underscore wide variation in candidates’ suitability for programmatic politics and highlight important challenges in transitioning away from clientelistic political equilibria.

Date: 2025
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