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Geography and the Gerrymander

C. O. Sauer

American Political Science Review, 1918, vol. 12, issue 3, 403-426

Abstract: The gerrymander is an American name for a political abuse, which, though by no means exclusively American, has been most widely practiced and generally tolerated in this country. It is a device for the partial suppression of public opinion that simulates agreement with democratic institutions. The subterfuge, therefore, has no place in countries in which oligarchic control is legitimized. Nor is it suited to European conditions, because it is difficult there to shift electoral boundaries. European electoral units in large part have a clearly defined historical basis, which in turn rests upon geographic coherence. This solidarity is commonly so great that it cannot be disregarded. American political divisions on the other hand show in major part very imperfect adjustment to economic and historic conditions, largely, because many of the divisions were created in advance of such conditions. They are, in the main, not gradual growths, but deliberate and arbitrary legislative creations, made without adequate knowledge of the conditions that make for unity or disunity of population within an area. Political divisions tend, therefore, to be less significant than in European countries and to be regarded more lightly. It is in particular the smaller unit, such as the county, that has been manipulated for electoral purposes. In spite of their poorly drawn individual boundaries, groups of counties can be organized into larger electoral units in such a manner as to represent a common body of interests predominating. On the other hand they can be so arranged as to mask these interests. The lack of proper coherence in the individual county may be rectified in large measure in the group, or it may be intensified. Gerrymandering accomplishes the latter result.

Date: 1918
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