Federal Aid to the States

Ben A. Arneson

American Political Science Review, 1922, vol. 16, issue 3, 443-454

Abstract: When a central authority orders a local subordinate government to take a certain course of action under penalty, it is more than likely that the enforcement of the order will lead to difficulties, and it may even result in open defiance on the part of the local government. The effect is very different, however, when the central authority merely establishes a standard and promises to turn over cold cash to the local units which meet the standard. With governmental units as with individuals, rewards for work properly done are more likely to produce desirable results than punishment for failure to obey orders.

Date: 1922
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