German Public Officers and the Right to Strike

Frederick F. Blachly and Miriam E. Oatman

American Political Science Review, 1928, vol. 22, issue 1, 157-161

Abstract: The German national public officer—a term which covers public employees of every rank, from watchmen and gate-keepers to the chancellor, and in every type of occupation, from engineering to diplomacy, from teaching to service on the bench of the highest courts—has a very special status, governed in part by the constitution, in part by the Law of Officers, and in part by many other statutes, such as a law fixing salaries. This status involves many rights and privileges, and on the other hand, many duties and restrictions. The oath of office required of all national officers consists of a pledge to be faithful to the constitution, obedient to the laws, and conscientious in the performance of official duties. The law requires every officer to conduct himself at all times, even in his private capacity, in such a way as to merit the respect due to his office. Misconduct is liable to the “ordinary” penalties of reprimand, warning, and money fine, or, after due hearing, to the “disciplinary” penalties of suspension and dismissal. The criminal code takes cognizance of certain specified crimes and misdemeanors in office, such as the improper bringing about of arrests and prosecutions, and the falsification of official records. Naturally, the officer is also liable when he commits any other type of crime or misdemeanor.The rights and privileges of public officers are very substantial. National officers are appointed, as a rule, for life; unless any appointment is specified as being revocable, it is per se a life appointment, involving protection against arbitrary dismissal or suspension.

Date: 1928
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