The Treaty-Making Power in Fascist Italy

H. Arthur Steiner

American Political Science Review, 1931, vol. 25, issue 1, 146-152

Abstract: Signor Mussolini's unequivocal refusal to cooperate in M. Briand's proposal of a United States of Europe and the intransigent policy adopted by Italy at the London Naval Conference of 1930 have again directed attention to the power which the Italian dictator possesses over the foreign policy of his country. The constitutional measures by which he has attained, and now holds, this power throw much light upon the Fascist régime.In Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, the conduct of foreign policy has been vested in the executive, subject to but few constitutional limitations. However, whereas most European constitutions confer upon the legislature an ultimate control over the foreign policy of the government, this has never been the case in Italy. The Statuto of March 4, 1848, which today remains the nominal fundamental law, endowed the king with almost exclusive jurisdiction over foreign relations. It is the king who “commands all land and naval forces; declares war; makes treaties of peace, alliance, commerce, and other treaties, communicating them to the house as soon as the interest and security of the state permit,” subject only to the limitation that “treaties involving financial obligations or alterations of the territory of the state shall not have effect until after they have received the approval of the houses.” Under the system of ministerial responsibility originally established, these powers came to be exercised by the ministers, the king personally assuming the familiar position of the constitutional monarch.

Date: 1931
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