Federal Governments and International Labor Agreements

Harold W. Stoke

American Political Science Review, 1931, vol. 25, issue 2, 424-431

Abstract: The International Labor Organization has become one of the most active of all the international institutions of the post-war period. According to the treaty of Versailles, international labor conferences, composed of delegates from countries which are members of the International Labor Organization, are to meet annually to consider and adopt recommendations and conventions applicable to labor problems and conditions throughout the world. The subjects for a number of possible agreements are suggested in the Versailles treaty, and include the right of association of laborers, the establishment of the eight-hour day, the adoption of the weekly rest period, the abolition of child labor, and various related matters. In drafting conventions and recommendations, the conferences are to be guided by a number of principles laid down in the Versailles treaty, and are asked to recognize that “differences of climate, habit and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labor difficult of immediate attainment.”Economic difficulties alone were recognized, at first, by the makers of the treaty of Versailles as standing in the way of the attainment of “strict uniformity in the conditions of labor.” It was, however, soon brought to the attention of the Peace Conference that governments might not all prove equally competent constitutionally to deal with labor problems, and that some might prove totally lacking in legal capacity to adhere to the proposed labor conventions. This legal limitation was felt to be especially likely to arise in the case of federal governments, in many of which all matters of labor legislation are reserved to the member-states, and hence are beyond the legislative powers of the central governments. It was predicted by some that these legal difficulties would prove more stubborn obstacles to the uniform regulation of labor matters than differences in climate, habits and customs, and economic opportunity.

Date: 1931
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