The Time of Meetings of Congress

Everett S. Brown

American Political Science Review, 1931, vol. 25, issue 4, 955-960

Abstract: In public discussions of the proposed Norris “lame duck” amendment, and in demands by members of Congress for special sessions to meet temporary emergencies, the fact is often overlooked that Congress itself has the power to regulate the time of its meeting. The fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution provides: “The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.” Under this provision, the much-criticized rush of bills in the short session could easily be averted by an act convening Congress at an earlier date than the first Monday in December. So, too, a Congress whose final session was coming to a close could provide that its successor should meet immediately, instead of waiting until the following December. A Congress desirous of a special session on a problem like unemployment could call such a session irrespective of lack of action by the President, provided it could command a majority sufficient to over-ride a possible presidential veto. Of course such action could be taken only while Congress was in session, because, under the provisions of the Constitution, the President is the only person who, between sessions, is empowered to call special sessions.These statements are not the result of theoretical speculation, but rest firmly on the facts of our legislative history. Prior to 1821, no fewer than eighteen acts were passed by Congress appointing a different day for its meetings from that stipulated in the Constitution. Before referring to these acts more in detail, it would perhaps clarify matters somewhat to recall to mind how March 4 was decided upon as a limit of presidential and congressional terms. Article VII of the Constitution provided that the instrument should go into effect when ratified by nine states. This was accomplished on June 21, 1788.

Date: 1931
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