Felony Trials Without a Jury

J. A. C. Grant

American Political Science Review, 1931, vol. 25, issue 4, 980-995

Abstract: Recent crime surveys have shown that the majority of contested felony cases are never tried in open court, being settled instead by the striking of a “bargain” between the defendant and the prosecuting officer. Administrative discretion has thus largely supplanted judge and jury alike. The practice has been severely criticized by Professor Moley, who characterizes it as “ psychologically more akin to a game of poker than to a process of justice,” being “an attempt to get as much as possible from an unwilling giver” rather than “a search for truth.” In view of the technicalities and delay that were permitted to develop in connection with jury trials, the utilization of some such avenue of escape would seem to have been inevitable. The practice may be expected to develop still further unless judicial procedure is improved to a point where a trial becomes an efficient means of disposing of contested criminal cases.In most jurisdictions, the only alternative to such a compromise agreement has been a jury trial. Trial by a judge alone, the right to a jury being waived, has been regarded as of doubtful constitutionality. Recent decisions of the federal Supreme Court and of the supreme court of Illinois, sustaining such non-jury trials even in the absence of statutory authorization, have gone far toward dispelling this doubt, and warrant an examination of the practical working of the waiver plan in those jurisdictions where it has been given a trial.

Date: 1931
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