Reorganization of the General Accounting Office

John McDiarmid

American Political Science Review, 1937, vol. 31, issue 3, 508-516

Abstract: President Roosevelt's message of January 12 urging a thorough reorganization of the administrative branch of the federal government was greeted by a Congress undoubtedly astounded at the number and revolutionary character of the reforms advocated. Among the suggestions around which opposition has crystallized is the proposed redistribution of the General Accounting Office's functions relating to accounting, expenditure control, and auditing between a more circumscribed “General Auditing Office” and the Treasury Department. It is unfortunate that the benefits to be derived from this reorganization are not widely recognized. On the contrary, the move easily lends itself to characterization as an arrogation of further power on the part of the Chief Executive and an attempted removal of the administrative branch of the government from any effective control by Congress. In the words of Senator Vandenberg, "it would put a muzzle on the only watch-dog that's left around here.” Publicity is given to the “proposed abolition of the Comptroller-General's office,” as though this independent critic of Administration expenditures were to be done away with entirely. Actually, under the President's plan provision is made for an independent audit which could be made more effective than the confused control exercised by the Comptroller-General under the present arrangement. In addition, the recognition of accounting and expenditure control as fundamental elements of management would bring into the federal system an increased efficiency in administration which is sadly needed.

Date: 1937
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