A List System with Single Candidate Preference

Harold F. Gosnell

American Political Science Review, 1939, vol. 33, issue 4, 645-650

Abstract: This article is not intended as a criticism of the objectives of proportional representation. The election of the New York City council in 1937 and the seven Cincinnati council elections under the Hare system of proportional representation have undoubtedly resulted in the improvement of the caliber of the legislative bodies in those cities. The aim of this article is to suggest certain rules which may secure some of the advantages of the Hare system without a long and costly count.

Date: 1939
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