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Federal Organization of Legal Functions

Carl Brent Swisher

American Political Science Review, 1939, vol. 33, issue 6, 973-1000

Abstract: Varied tasks throughout the vast field of activities of the executive branch of the federal government can be performed only by persons with training in one of more branches of law. The tasks run all the way from the administration of locally established rules and regulations of the several government agencies to the argument of fundamentally important constitutional questions before the Supreme Court. Down through the years of American history there has been conflict of opinion as to the proper mode of organizing the legal work of the government. It is contended, on the one hand, that functions of a highly specialized and highly professionalized character such as those of law ought, in the interest of symmetry and efficiency, to be integrated under centralized management. To a limited extent, such integration has been brought about in the Department of Justice. On the other hand, it is contended that the work of lawyers merely aids in the performance of more fundamental classifications of work done by the government, and that organization should be in terms of such topics as finance, foreign affairs, commerce, agriculture, and labor, with legal tasks grouped in subordinate categories and subject to control only by the respective heads of the major organizations. In line with this contention, all major departments and most other agencies have staffs of lawyers not directly connected with the Department of Justice.

Date: 1939
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