Independence of State Regulatory Agencies

James W. Fesler

American Political Science Review, 1940, vol. 34, issue 5, 935-947

Abstract: Transference to administrative agencies of powers traditionally associated with legislatures and with courts has destroyed old categories of political science, and necessitates a reappraisal of the structure of American governments. The story of the growth of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers has been told too well to require extensive treatment here. With the development of the social service state, the legislatures, we are informed, have been illequipped to legislate in detailed fashion because of the quantity and the technicality of governmental activities and because of the need for flexibility and adaptability in the conduct of those activities. Two other reasons for delegation of legislative power may be advanced. The legislature may wish to devolve the responsibility of self-government on a particular industry or vocational group. Or again, it may desire to wash its hands of a particularly trying problem of public policy, and this it can do by turning the problem over to an administrative agency.

Date: 1940
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